Offshore Energy Infrastructure and National Security Concerns

Oil and gas operators in the UK North Sea are currently unaware of evolving threat levels against their offshore infrastructure because these facilities are not designated as critical national infrastructure. This lack of designation limits intelligence sharing between the government and the industry. Graham Skinner, health, safety and security policy manager at Offshore Energies UK (OEUK), told a UK parliamentary committee that designating offshore energy infrastructure as critical national infrastructure would be the easiest way to access existing UK governance for energy facilities, addressing a governance challenge in this space.

Increased Russian Naval Activity and Threat Landscape

Russian naval activity focused on infrastructure mapping and spying around UK waters has increased by 30% over the past two years, prompting the UK government to publicly highlight potential threats to energy and communications infrastructure. While the industry is comfortable with standard safety protocols, Skinner cautioned that the sector would struggle to understand the intent of state actors and how quickly risks might escalate. Although there have been a limited number of drone sightings around offshore infrastructure, the industry is most concerned about insider attacks or cyber incidents, as the sector already faces hundreds of attacks daily.

Proposed Solutions and Existing Measures

Skinner suggested the UK could follow Norway's example by creating a regular maritime forum that brings the offshore industry directly together with security services, which would increase situational awareness across the sector from fishermen to energy companies. A long-awaited security reporting portal designed to streamline reporting and response to suspicious activity has yet to materialize, though a good reporting framework developed with the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero was launched in March. OEUK recently coordinated a security exercise called Granite Security with North Sea operators to test resilience to various threats, but Skinner called for further government engagement on performance standards for expected uptime, speed to repair, and creating a national resource for pipeline or cable repair.

Obstacles to Pipeline and Cable Repair

Pipeline and cable repair faces a major obstacle, as Elizabeth Braw, senior fellow at Atlantic Council, noted that there are not enough repair crews skilled in undersea cable repairs. Chloe Oakshett, a maritime lawyer at Addleshaw Goddard, cautioned that security clearance for workers involved in classified work around pipeline or cable repairs takes too long, creating a possible choke point in energy resilience. For oil and gas operators, a key concern is who will bear the risk for any attack. While a company can accept the financial cost of an individual shutdown on safety grounds, Skinner asked what would happen if 20 gas installations were attacked in the middle of winter, emphasizing the need for those conversations now.

Government Response and Future Strategy

The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero told Upstream that it will publish a new Energy Resilience Strategy this year to secure the energy system. A spokesperson stated that energy resilience and security is the top priority, and the department works closely with stakeholders like OEUK and National Grid to protect vital offshore, subsea, and onshore energy infrastructure against a range of threats. The Department also launched a new cyber security strategy for the energy sector this week and already collaborates with subsea and offshore owners and operators on information sharing, monitoring, and detection capabilities.